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-The Significance of Sexed Bodies:
 
An Analysis of Moira Gatens' (~ Critique
 
of the Sex/Gender Distinction"
 
By Anna Gullickson 
I n "A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction," Moira Gatens states that some gender theorists accept the "unreasoned, unargued assumption that both the body and the psyche are post-natally pas­
sive tabula rasa" (139). Gatens believes the claim is false and failing to 
recognize its falsity will lead to na'ive theories that resocialization or 
degendering could realistically attain woman's liberation. If the body 
and mind are considered passive mediators of cultural inscriptions, 
then unlearning "patriarchy's arbitrary and oppressive codes" could 
obliterate women's oppression. If femininity is oppressive and learned, 
then it can and should be unlearned. Yet, Gatens will claim that there 
is a fundamental connection between sex and gender and that there is 
a difference between the sexes, and, consequently, she will firmly deny 
the possibility of degendering. I will outline how Gatens does this and 
then assess whether or not she is successful. 
To fully understand Gatens' claim, we must first understand the cur­
rents of feminism that surround her argument. Gatens is a feminist of dif­
ference replying to feminists of equality. The feminists of equality, in turn, 
are responding to claims of essentialism, especially naturalism and biolo­
gismo Essentialism posits fixed essences, most importantly for our purposes, 
for females and males. Naturalism and biologism are forms of essentialism. 
Biologism claims that biology is what fixes the essence of men and women. 
Naturalism is similar, but fixes the essence of the sexes in the 'nature' 
instead of their biology. This is often seen as biology, but can also be seen 
through theology or ontology, for example. l It is not difficult to see how 
essentialism could and has been used to oppress women. Essentialism is 
limiting and has been used as an excuse to limit women in unfair ways 
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throughout time and throughout the world. 
One way of rebelling against essentialist claims that oppress women is 
by expounding a feminism of equality. According to ~at~ns, feminists of 
equality claim the equality of males and females not Just In terms of equal 
value (for example, a claim like 'women are just as intelligent as men') but 
also in terms of sameness. The equality/sameness is secured in this view by 
claiming that there is no significant difference between men ~nd women. 
The difference is biology and biology does not affect the subject. Gatens 
points out three assumptions she finds implicit in this claim: (~) the body 
and the consciousness are separate, (2) the body and the conscIOusness are 
neutral at birth, and (3) the consciousness is what constitutes the subject. 
So, males and females are different at birth, but only bodily. Since the 
body is neutral, it cannot affect the consciousness. There is n~ way, t?en, 
that the consciousness of males and females would become different natu­
rallYj' that is, by anything that is in us. However, observable gender differ­
ences do exist. So, it must be something outside of us that forms gender 
differences, something social/cultural. Culture is certainly contingent and 
something contingent could not create something necessary, so our gen­
ders, too, must be contingent. Thus, the reason that gender differences 
exist is not that there is an 'essence' to the sexes. Instead, it is a cultural 
construction applied continently to the naturally occurring sex differences. 
Gatens finds the scientific support for this view coming mainly from the 
work of Robert J. Stoller, a psychoanalyst. After research with biologically 
anomalous and 'psychologically disturbed' people, Stoller concluded that, 
as Gatens puts it, "gender identity is primarily a result of post~n~tal p~y­
chological influences" (141-42). This firmly denied the essentialist claims 
that the feminists of equality were fighting against. Stoller's research sug­
gested that there is no one way women are. Whatever gender behaviors 
women take on are, at the very least, culturally tainted. Probably, and 
according to these feminists, they are totally determined by culture. Kate 
Millett is given by Gatens as a representative of these feminists. In her 
Sexual Politics, Millett states: "Psychosexually (e.g. in terms of masculine 
and feminine, and in contradistinction to male and female) there is no dif­
ferentiation between the sexes at birth. Psychosexual personality is there­
fore postnatal and learned."2 This belief, coupled with the disadvantage the 
current arbitrary arrangement of gender identity gives to women, leads 
Millett to suggest resocialization, according to Gatens. To escape patri­
archy's artificial application of gender identities, we should 'unlearn' gen­
der; therefore, the result would be an androgynous people. 
45 
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ion, it could never work and the reason these theorists think it will is that 
their theory is based on a confused distinction and characterization of the 
body and consciousness. In Gatens' opinion, this confusion underlies all 
the work of the socialization theorist on sex and gender. Gatens disagrees 
with two of their first three assumptions-that the body and consciousness 
are separate and that they are neutral at birth. Gatens' response is that the 
body and consciousness are neither neutral nor separate in the simple ways 
the socialization theorists claim and that their account results in behavior­
ism, which is unacceptable. 
The socialization theorists take the sex/gender distinction to be a dis­
tinction between the body and the mind/consciousness. Gatens argues that 
if the subject is split like this into body and consciousness, then how the 
subject is determined is seen as either by the body or the consciousness, or 
a mixture. However, both the body and the consciousness are assumed 
neutral in socialization/equality theory. So, these theorists are left with the 
cultural environment working on the passive consciousness connected to a 
passive body. Gatens find the view that the consciousness of the subject is 
determined by environment to be naively causal. She states, "If we con­
ceive of the body as neutral and passive and of the consciousness as socially 
determined, then we are at least halfway to a behavioral conception of sub­
jectivity," which is inadequate to account for human behavior (144). 
Though Gatens does not seem to have a clear picture of what does account 
for our behavior, she finds the theory of Deutsch promising, which posits: 
There is one unitary reality underlying two (or more) distinct levels 
of theoretical abstraction and that the 'mysterious leap' [from the 
mind to the body] is actually a leap from one kind of discourse, say 
the psychological, to another, the physiological. (144)3 
Gatens does not develop this idea here and even hints that she wouldn't 
know how to, but she clearly favors this view over prospects of behaviorism. 
Gatens also assures us that the body is not neutral, and she does this 
without employing essentialism. She does not claim that there is any 
essence to what it is to be a woman, but she does think that there is some­
thing that it means to be a woman. We cannot escape our sex: 
"Concerning the neutrality of the body, let me be explicit, there is no neu­
tral body, there are at least tow kinds of bodies; the male body and the 
female body.... The subject is always a sexed subject" (145). 
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We cannot escape our sex because the body and the mind are not dis­
tinct from each other in their forming of the subject. The body, from 
which we cannot escape, constantly affects us. It is embedded in what it 
means to be the person we are, and is necessarily bound up in our gender. 
As a result, the same gender behaviors acted out by two subjects of differ­
ent sexes have different significances both to us and to those around us. 
Everything we do and think is drenched in the cultural meaning of what it 
means to be sexed. As Gatens puts it, "Each gesture, attitude, perception, 
that enters human consciousness, does so charged with significance that 
relate to all that has gone before" (145). We cannot simply forget or 
'unlearn' the past, and this is precisely what resocialization theorists aim to 
do. They plan to erase these social and personal significances of being a 
sexed subject. Gatens believes this is impossible. We cannot claim that the 
development of the identity happens in consciousness and ignore that con­
sciousness is embodied, and that the body has a sex. 
This is a compelling critique of degendering. However, this is not sur­
prising: androgyny for the masses is not exactly the most popular tenet of 
feminism of equality. In fact, I would suggest that most feminists of equali­
ty would agree with Gatens that it would never work. It seems that even 
the sources Gatens highlights that are proponents of degendering are not as 
enthusiastic about the idea as Gatens makes them out to be. For example, 
she says Stoller thought that a person's gender identity was primarily a 
result of post-natal psychological influences. It seems that somewhere along 
the line the 'primarily' was forgotten or ignored. Even Millett, who is 
Gatens' choice to present of the resocialization theorists, doesn't explicitly 
suggest degendering in the quote that Gatens offers. Millett say 'one has 
some cause to admire' it. Perhaps our gender is primarily a result of outside 
influences. Perhaps we do have some cause to admire degendering. Gatens 
does not disprove these claims-she doesn't even attempt it. Gatens argues 
successfully against the practical application of degendering, but does not 
do as good a job arguing against its theoretical underpinnings. It is only by 
proving that the underlying assumptions beneath degendering are false that 
she can make any headway in explaining the sex/gender distinction, and it 
is this distinction for which she titles her article and presumably wants to 
place her emphasis. 
For example, she states that feminists of equality that assume a blank 
slate unwittingly accept the mind/body distinction: 
This leads to a conception of the subject of either predominantly (or 
47 
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wholly) determined by biological forces, i.e. heredity or predomi­
nantly (or wholly) determined by the influence of social or familial 
relations, i.e. environment. Both these positions, the latter being the 
one that would best characterize resocialisation feminists, posit a 
na'ive causal relation between either the body and the mind or the 
environment and the mind which commits both viewpoints, as two 
sides of the same coin, to an a priori, neutral and passive conception 
of the subject. (I 44) 
But she does not explain why they are committed to this conception of 
the body and mind. There is nothing in a blank slate philosophy that 
implies a spurious connection between the body and mind, and Gatens 
seems to think there is. She also does not explain why accepting a distinc­
tion between the body and mind would be a bad thing. Apparently, she 
finds it na"ive, but does not explain why. She also does not defend her 
claim that behaviorism is na"ive. 
Even if we accept that these theorists are mistakenly accepting the 
mind/body distinction, I see no reason that they will think that either the 
mind or the body is predominantly or wholly constituting the subject. It is 
not apparent why a mind/body distinction would lead one to believe that 
either the mind or the body is especially dominant. 
Perhaps more importantly, Gatens does not develop a counter theory 
that sounds any better than the ones against which she is arguing. 
Basically, all her criticism comes down to this: We're not a blank slate at 
birth. If we say that we are, then we are lead to behaviorism, and ultimate­
ly, that is na"ive. As I have shown, I am not convinced by her arguments in 
this vein. However, even if she is not totally convincing in her criticisms, 
she could still be persuasive by offering a theory that appears more plausi­
ble, Unfortunately, she does only a vague and incomplete job of giving her 
readers an account of the sex/gender distinction. She alludes to psycho­
analysis, and these ideas are intriguing, but she simply does not develop 
these ideas enough for her reader to judge them fairly. It is impossible to 
say for sure with only the information that Gatens provides in the article, 
but it seems possible that the reason that she doesn't offer a positive 
account in any depth is that she is unsure and that her hunches are leading 
her toward essentialism, which is very hard to defend. So, instead of tread­
ing in essentialist waters, she 'evades the question. 
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